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Extradition and the Conflict in Northern
Ireland: The Past, Present and Future of
an Intractable Problem
BY MARGARET I. BRANICK*
Introduction
British government efforts to extradite members of the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) from the United States
have posed challenges to U.S. extradition policy since "the troubles"
in Northern Ireland intensified in the 1970s.' Under extradition law,
"political offenses" traditionally are treated as non-extraditable
offenses.2 Indeed, the 1972 extradition treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom (1972 Treaty) specifically exempted
offenses "of a political character."3 American courts applying the
1972 Treaty, however, refused to allow the extradition of fugitive
members of the IRA after concluding that their crimes were political
offenses.4 British government resentment5 and American foreign
* J.D. candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2002;
M.A., University College Dublin; B.A., University of Notre Dame.
1. The District Court for the Southern District of New York summed up the
background to "the troubles" cogently: "It seems clear.., that the centuries old
hatreds and political divisions which were spawned by England's conquest of Ireland
in medieval times continue to resist any permanent resolution. Instead they have
smoldered, sometimes during long periods of quiescence, only to repeatedly erupt
with tragic consequences." In re Requested Extradition of Doherty, 599 F. Supp.
270,273 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
2. I. A. SHEARER, STARKE's INTERNATIONAL LAW 319 (11th ed., 1994).
3. Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. V, 28 U.S.T. 227 [hereinafter 1972 Treaty]. The
1972 Treaty entered into force on January 21, 1977.
4. See, e.g., In re Extradition of McMullen, Mag. No. 3-70-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal.
May 11, 1979), reprinted in 132 CONG. REc. S16,585-86 (1986); In re Requested
Extradition of Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 275-76.
5. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711,714 (9th Cir. 1995).
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policy concerns 6 prompted the United States and the United
Kingdom to modify the 1972 Treaty through a Supplementary Treaty
signed in 1985 (Supplementary Treaty), which eliminated the political
offense exception for broad categories of violent acts.7
In Part I, this Note will briefly review the background of the
conflict in Northern Ireland. Part II of this Note will then discuss
extradition law and the political offense exception with respect to
extradition of IRA fugitives from the United States. Part III presents
criticisms of the Supplementary Treaty and examines alternatives for
reform. This Note will conclude by discussing how recent peace
process efforts have changed the political landscape so that the
Supplementary Treaty is no longer necessary or desirable.
I. Overview of the Conflict in Northern Ireland
At its most rudimentary level, "the troubles" in Northern Ireland
are rooted in whether the six counties of the North should remain
within the United Kingdom (U.K.) or become part of the Republic of
Ireland. Politics is only a small part of the problem, however, and it
would be impossible to understand or resolve the conflict without
addressing other factors, including history, identity, religion, culture,
security, and human rights, which are beyond the scope of this Note.
Northern Ireland is located in the northeast corner of the island
of Ireland.8 In 1921, after years of turmoil over Britain's presence in
Ireland, the British government partitioned the island into Northern
Ireland and the Irish Free State. Northern Ireland remained part of
the U.K. while the Irish Free State gained its independence and
ultimately became a republic. Northern Ireland had its own
parliament at Stormont from 1921 until 1972. The British
government, however, sent its army into Northern Ireland in 19699
6. Terrorism Legislation, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1986) (statement of Hon. Stephen S.
Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Dept. of Justice); 132 CONG.
REc. S16,586 (1986) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
7. Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.K., T.I.A.S.
No. 12,050 [hereinafter Supplementary Treaty]. The Supplementary Treaty entered
into force on December 23, 1986.
8. Northern Ireland is comprised of six of the nine counties that made up the
historic Irish province of Ulster. See generally PETER & FIONA SOMERSET FRY, A
HISTORY OF IRELAND 319-40 (1988).
9. CHARLEs TOWNSHEND, IRELAND: THE 20TH CENTURY 202 (1998).
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when sectarian tensions and protests over civil rights erupted into
violence."0 In 1972, the British government suspended home rule and
assumed direct rule over Northern Ireland."
From partition in 1921 through today, Northern Ireland has been
one state with two distinct communities. In general, the "Catholic-
Nationalist-Republican" community has sought to return control over
the six counties of Northern Ireland to the Republic of Ireland, while
the "Protestant-Loyalist" or Unionist community has sought to
preserve Northern Ireland's status as part of the U.K. No one
theory, however, adequately explains the intractable nature of the
divisions and hostilities between these two groups.'3 Political,
religious, economic, cultural and psychological factors all play a part
in driving the two communities further apart. 4
Extremist elements from both sides have expressed their
ambitions through acts of political violence or terror (depending on
one's perspective). Paramilitary groups associated with the
Nationalist perspective include the IRA, the Irish National Liberation
Army, the Irish People's Liberation Organization, and recent
offshoots from the IRA such as the Real IRA and Continuity IRA.'"
The main paramilitary groups associated with the Unionist viewpoint
include the Ulster Volunteer Force, the Ulster Defense Association
(also called the Ulster Freedom Fighters), and the Loyalist Volunteer
Force.'6 Both within Northern Ireland and in the international
10. Id. at 206-07. The violence climaxed in January 1972 when British
paratroopers fired on a peaceful protest in Derry, killing thirteen unarmed
demonstrators. See British Troops Kill 13 in Londonderry Rioting, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
31, 1972, at 1. This event came to be known as "Bloody Sunday." TOWNSHEND,
supra note 9, at 206-07.
11. FRY, supra note 8, at 337. The rise of Nationalist and Unionist paramilitary
groups during the 1960s contributed to the intensification of violence in Northern
Ireland. TOWNSHEND, supra note 9, at 207.
12. The difficulty in finding the appropriate terminology is reflected the district
court's decision in In re Requested Extradition of Artt, Brennan & Kirby, 972 F. Supp.
1253, 1257 (N.D. Cal. 1997), rev'd 158 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 1998), reh'g granted, 183 F.3d
944 (9th Cir. 1999) (dismissed following British government withdrawal of extradition
request).
13. See generally DAVID BLOOMFIELD, PEACEMAKING STRATEGIES IN NORTHERN
IRELAND 8-13 (1997).
14. Id. (citing John Hunter, An Analysis of the Conflict in Northern Ireland, in
POLITICAL CO-OPERATION IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES 9-59 (Desmond Rea ed., 1982)).
15. See generally Kieran McEvoy, Humanitarian Interventions and Paramilitaries,
in HUMAN RIGHTS, EQUALITY AND DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL IN NORTHERN IRELAND
215,217-18 (Colin J. Harvey ed., 2001).
16. See generally id. at 218-19.
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community, there are differing views on whether members of
paramilitary groups, in particular the IRA, are freedom fighters
engaged in political struggle or terrorists.7
Various efforts to restore peace and re-establish home rule in
Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s failed.'8 In the 1990s,
however, the climate started to change. A complex series of
negotiations, "talks about talks," and actual dialogue among the
prime ministers of Ireland and the U.K., the Northern Irish political
parties, and the paramilitaries culminated in the signing of the Belfast
Agreement in April 1998.'9 The Belfast Agreement sought to end
three decades of bitter conflict and lay the foundation for peaceful
coexistence among the people of Northern Ireland. Progress has
been made on the various "strands" of the Agreement.' The
paramilitary ceasefires have suffered setbacks but generally
17. Compare J. Bowyer Bell, Revolutionary Organizations: Special Cases and
Imperfect Models, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND WORLD SECURITY 78, 78-83
(David Carlton & Carlo Schaerf eds., 1975) (suggesting Provisional Irish Republican
Army campaign is part of a long history of Irish rebellion against England), with
Matthew S. Podell, Note, Removing Blinders from the Judiciary: In re Artt, Brennan,
Kirby as an Evolutionary Step in the United States-United Kingdom Extradition
Scheme, 23 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 263, 273 (2000) (suggesting Supplementary
Treaty was necessary to prevent abuse of political offense exception by IRA
terrorists).
18. In 1973, the U.K. and Ireland signed the Sunningdale Agreement, which
established a power-sharing executive assembly in Northern Ireland and a "Council
of Ireland" to give Ireland an "executive and harmonising" role in Northern Ireland.
This agreement took effect on January 1, 1974 but was suspended in May after
Unionists mounted a general strike in opposition. See TOWNSHEND, supra note 9, at
211-12. Subsequent attempts to organize all-party negotiations in Northern Ireland
met with little success. Id. at 226-27. The Anglo-Irish Agreement signed in
Hillsborough in 1985 was the next significant step towards reaching some sort of
resolution in Northern Ireland. Clive R. Symmons, The Anglo-Irish Agreement and
International Precedents: A Unique Experiment in Inter-State Co-operation on
Minority Rights, in LESSONS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND 221 (Jon Hayes & Paul
O'Higgins eds., 1990); TOWNSHEND, supra note 9, at 228. Although the Unionist
community strongly opposed the agreement, it was not met with the large scale
protests that had sabotaged the Sunningdale Agreement, and the intergovernmental
conference made progress in some areas. TOWNSHEND, supra note 9, at 229-30.
19. Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, U.K.-Ire.
[hereinafter Belfast Agreement], available at
http:lwww.ireland.com/speciallpeace/theprocess/ageementlagreement.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2001). The Belfast Agreement is also known as the Good Friday
Agreement.
20. See generally Northern Ireland Office Online, Press Archives, Achievements
in Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, at
http:llwww.nio.gov.uklpress/010714z.htm (July 14,2001).
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survived." Thus, the 1990s brought new hope for peace in Northern
Ireland as government leaders, political parties, paramilitaries and
other actors appeared to recognize that it was in everyone's interest
to work together. '
Of great importance to members of all paramilitary groups were
the Belfast Agreement provisions relating to the early release of
paramilitary prisoners.' The Agreement required the British and
Irish governments to create mechanisms for "accelerated" release of
any prisoner convicted of a scheduled offense, i.e. terrorist offense,
who was a member of a paramilitary group honoring a ceasefire. "
Further, it provided that all paramilitary prisoners be released within
two years of the start of the early release program.' As will be
discussed below, these provisions have had an impact on the British
government's pursuit of extradition of IRA fugitives.
U. Extradition and IRA Fugitives
A. Background on Extradition
Extradition is the process whereby "one state surrenders to
another state at its request a person accused or convicted of a
criminal offence committed against the laws of the requesting state,
such requesting state being competent to try the alleged offender.
26
Extradition ensures that serious crimes do not go unpunished simply
21. The IRA declared a ceasefire in August 1994, and the "Combined Loyalist
Command" issued a ceasefire on behalf of Loyalist paramilitaries later that year.
TOWNSHEND, supra note 9, at 231. Progress on actual peace talks snagged on several
issues and the IRA abandoned its ceasefire in February 1996, exploding a bomb in
East London. See Richard W. Stevenson, Bomb Wounds 100 in London as IRA
Truce Is Said to End, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1996, at Al. The IRA restored its
ceasefire in July 1997. TOWNSHEND, supra note 9, at 233. Republican paramilitaries
opposed to the IRA's participation in the talks formed splinter factions, such as the
Real IRA and Continuity IRA. Id. However, the Real IRA declared its own
ceasefire in 1998. Additionally, the Irish National Liberation Army, a dissident
group that had separated previously from the IRA, declared a ceasefire in 1998. See
Kieran McEvoy, Academic Viewpoint: Prisoners, the Agreement, and the Political
Character of the Northern Ireland Conflict, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1539, 1563-64
(1999).
22. See generally Brice Dickson, Protection of Human Rights-Lessons from
Northern Ireland, 3 EuR. HUM. RTS. L.R. 213 (2000).
23. Belfast Agreement, supra note 19, at 27; see generally McEvoy, supra note 21.
24. Belfast Agreement, supra note 19, at 27.
25. Id. at 27-28.
26. SHEARER, supra note 2, at 317.
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because the criminal has sought refuge in another State.27 Extradition
is rooted in the belief that the State where the crime has been
committed has the greatest interest in trying and punishing the
offender, and is in the best position to do so.' Customary
international law is silent on the issue of extradition, and does not
require that States follow any particular course of action with respect
to the return of fugitives.29 Thus, extradition treaties and State laws
govern extradition of offenders."
In the United States, the substantive rights of individuals facing
extradition are defined by extradition treaties while the procedural
aspects of extradition are codified in Title 18 of the United States
Code.3' A State seeking extradition of a fugitive must file a complaint
made under oath in the jurisdiction where the fugitive is found,
charging the individual with a crime as provided for by the extradition
treaty. 2  The judge or magistrate then issues a warrant for the
individual's apprehension, and holds a hearing to consider the
evidence of that individual's criminality.33 If the judge or magistrate
determines that the evidence is "sufficient to sustain the charge under
the provisions of the proper treaty or convention," she certifies the
accused to the Secretary of State for surrender to the requesting
State.'M The Secretary of State then may surrender the accused or
refuse the request.35 If the judge or magistrate determines that the
individual may be extradited, the accused can seek a writ of habeas
corpus, the denial or grant of which may be appealed. However, if
the judge or magistrate concludes that the individual is exempt from
extradition, that decision is not appealable by the United States. 6
Since the nineteenth century, "political crimes" and "political
offenders" generally have been exempted from extradition
proceedings.37  Extradition treaties typically contain clauses
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 318.
30. Id.
31. Barbara Ann Banoff & Christopher Pyle, "To Surrender the Political
Offenders": The Political Offense Exception to Extradition in United States Law, 16
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 169, 175 (1984); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3196 (2000).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (2000).
36. United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491,493, 495 (2d Cir. 1986).
37. SHEARER, supra note 2, at 319-20.
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exempting political offenses from extradition.' The political offense
exception to extradition has a number of justifications. Originally,
liberal European States used a form of the exception to shelter
political refugees during the nineteenth century. 9  Today, the
exception is rooted in the belief that individuals have a right to turn
to political activism to foster change. 40 The political offense exception
also reflects the concern that dissidents should be protected from
government retaliation for political activities or speech.41
Additionally, the exception ensures that the State harboring the
individual does not get caught in the middle of political turmoil in
other States.42 Finally, the international community generally views
political crimes as less offensive and more deserving of lenient
treatment than common crimes, partly because political crimes do not
pose the same threat beyond the borders of the State where the acts
occurred.*
3
A fundamental difficulty in applying the political offense
exception is that "political offense" is virtually never defined in any of
treaties providing for its use 4 and various interpretations are
possible.5  Political offenses may be classified as "pure" or
"relative., 46 Pure political offenses are actions that lack elements of
38. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception in Extradition Law and
Practice, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 398, 399 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 1975) [hereinafter Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception]; see also
132 CONG. REC. S16,588 (1986) (statement of Sen. Pell) ("All of the more than 100
extradition treaties that the United States has concluded have included a provision
excluding political offenses .... ).
39. SHEARER, supra note 2, at 320. A form of political offense exception
appeared first in Belgian law in 1833; France and Switzerland enacted similar laws in
1834, and England in 1870. Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception, supra note 38,
at 398, 401.
40. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986); R. Stuart Phillips, The
Political Offence Exception and Terrorism: Its Place in the Current Extradition
Scheme and Proposals for its Future, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 337,340 (1997).
41. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 793; John Patrick Groarke, Revolutionaries Beware: The
Erosion of the Political Offense Exception Under the 1986 United States-United
Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1515, 1519 (1988).
42. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 793; Groarke, supra note 41, at 1520.
43. Groarke, supra note 41, at 1519-20; see Bassiouni, The Political Offense
Exception, supra note 38, at 402-03, 444.
44. Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception, supra note 38, at 399; see, e.g.,
1972 Treaty, supra note 3, art. V; see also 132 CONG. REc. S16,592 (1986) (statement
of Sen. D'Amato) (emphasizing that the U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty fails to define
what constitutes a political offense).
45. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 793.
46. Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception, supra note 38, at 404; Banoff &
2002]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
common crimes and are directed exclusively against the State,
government or its political structures.47  Treason, sedition and
espionage are typical examples of pure political offenses.' Courts
and the international community generally accept that individuals
who commit pure political offenses should not be subject to
extradition.49  Relative political offenses, however, are more
problematic because such crimes may involve a combination of
criminal and political elements, or may be common crimes committed
for political reasons.'
Courts examining applicability of the exception to relative
political offenses consider various factors, which can include (1) the
degree of political involvement of the actor in the ideology or
movement on behalf of which she acted, including her personal belief
that the criminal act was justified and necessary; (2) the existence of a
nexus between the criminal act and the political motive; and (3) the
proportionality of the means relative to the political objective to be
attained." However, courts worldwide use different approaches when
determining whether relative political crimes fall within the political
offense exception.'
1. Political Motivation Test
The "political motivation test" is an approach to the political
offense exception that emerged from Swiss courts.' Under this
approach, the court scrutinizes the offender's ideological motivation
and balances the proportionality of the means to the ends. 4 The
general requirements underlying this standard were set forth in 1908
in V. P. Wassiliefi (1) the offense was committed to further a purely
political purpose; (2) there is a direct connection between the crime
and the offender's purpose to modify the political or social structure
of the State; and (3) the political element predominates over the
Pyle, supra note 31, at 178.
47. Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception, supra note 38, at 405.
48. Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem
of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226, 1234 (1962).
49. Id. at 1234; Banoff & Pyle, supra note 31, at 178.
50. Phillips, supra note 40, at 342-43.
51. Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception, supra note 38, at 411.
52. See generally id. at 412-30.
53. Id. at 423.
54. Id. at 424.
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common criminal element." Political motivation is a central element,
but in practice the second two requirements significantly narrow the
scope of the test. Swiss courts have adopted a rule that terrorism is
"almost per se" not proportional to the achievement of a political
agenda." One commentator has suggested that the political
motivation test is a desirable approach because it allows courts to
weigh the merits of each case individually, considering not only the
motivation of the actor but also the predominance of the political
aspects over the common criminal elements of the offense."
2. Injured Rights Test
A second major approach is the "injured rights test" or "political
objective test," set forth in the French case, In re Gatti." In Gatti, the
court stated that an offense does not derive its political character
from the motive of the offender but rather from "the nature of the
rights it injures."' Under this approach, political offenses are limited
to offenses that directly threaten or injure the State. One advantage
of this approach is its objectivity: an act is a political offense if it
harms or is intended to harm the State.6 However, this test in effect
extends protection only to pure political offenses because it assumes a
crime is not a political offense if the State is not the victim, and thus
fails to provide any protection for relative political offenses."
In practice, French courts have moved away from the injured
rights test and have started adopting a mixed approach in the past two
decades.63 In more recent extradition cases, for example, French
courts have looked to the motive of the offender and the seriousness
of the crime when determining whether an offense is political.6
55. Id.
56. Phillips, supra note 40, at 346; Garcia-Mora, supra note 48, at 1252-53.
57. Phillips, supra note 40, at 347.
58. Garcia-Mora, supra note 48, at 1256.
59. In re Gatti, [1946-1947] Ann. Dig. 145 (No. 70) (Fr.); Garcia-Mora, supra note
48, at 1249; Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception, supra note 38, at 421-22.
60. Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception, supra note 38, at 422 (quoting In
re Gatti, [1946-1947] Ann. Dig. 145 (No. 70) (Fr.)).
61. Garcia-Mora, supra note 48, at 1251.
62. Id.
63. Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception, supra note 38, at 421; Phillips,
supra note 40, at 348.
64. Phillips, supra note 40, at 348; see Michael R. Littenberg, Comment, The
Political Offense Exception: An Historical Analysis and Model for the Future, 64 TuL.
L. REv. 1196, 1201-04 (1990) (discussing evolution of approach to political offense
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3. Political Incidence Test
Both the United States and the United Kingdom apply the
"political incidence test," first articulated in In re Castioni.65 In
Castioni, the British House of Lords denied a request from
Switzerland for the extradition of a Swiss national who had killed a
member of a local Swiss government.' The British court determined
that the offense was political because it was committed "incidental to
and formed part of political disturbances."6 7  The United States
refined the political incidence test in In re Ezeta, requiring that the
act be committed during an actual conflict between armed forces and
in furtherance of the conflict for it to be a non-extraditable political
offense.' In Ezeta, the Ninth Circuit refused to extradite fugitives to
El Salvador to face murder and robbery charges after concluding that
the fugitives' acts were committed during the course of hostilities
between opposing forces and were "closely identified" with the
uprising.69 The Supreme Court reiterated the political incidence test
in Ornelas v. Ruiz, where the Court allowed extradition of an
individual to Mexico for murder, arson, robbery and kidnapping.70
The Court rejected application of the political offense exception,
concluding that the crimes were contemporaneous with a political
uprising but were essentially unrelated to the revolutionary
movement .
The political incidence test as applied in the United States thus
has two requirements: (1) the act was committed during political
disturbance, and (2) the offense in question was "incidental to," "in
the course of" or "in furtherance of" the political unrest.72 Rigid
application of the political incidence test has had controversial
results.73 For example, in United States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovic,
a district court denied extradition of an alleged Yugoslavian war
criminal because his crimes were committed in Croatia during and in
exception in French courts).
65. Groarke, supra note 41, at 1522; see In re Castioni, 1 Q.B. 149 (1891).
66. Groarke, supra note 41, at 1522.
67. Castioni, 1 Q.B. at 166.
68. In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 997-1005 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
69. Id.
70. Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896); see Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776,
797 (9th Cir. 1986).
71. Ornelas, 161 U.S. at 510-512.
72. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 797.
73. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 31, at 184.
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furtherance of a bona fide struggle for political power between Serbs
and Croats.'
Additionally, courts have shown some willingness to modify the
two prongs of the political incidence test in cases involving violence
and/or terrorism. For example, in Eain v. Wilkes, the Seventh Circuit
added several new limitations to the political offense exception when
the court affirmed a magistrate's decision to allow extradition of a
member of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).' The
Seventh Circuit suggested that the uprising requirement could be
satisfied only by showing the existence of a struggle between
organized, well-defined military forces. 6 The court then concluded
that the PLO's acts were not political because the PLO sought to
drive the Israeli population out of the territory, and any effects on
political structures would only be incidental to the disruption of social
structures.' Finally, the court held that indiscriminate acts of
violence against innocent civilians were per se not protected as
political acts."
In In re Extradition of McMullen and In re Requested Extradition
of Mackin, discussed below, the Second Circuit applied the political
incidence test in its traditional, rigid form to deny the extradition of
fugitive IRA members. The District Court for the Southern District
of New York and the Ninth Circuit, however, have adopted modified
versions of the political incidence test, as shown in In re Requested
Extradition of Doherty and Quinn v. Robinson, also discussed below.' °
4. The Rule of Non-Inquiry
The rule of non-inquiry is another central principle of U.S.
extradition law that can arise in cases examining the political offense
74. United States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383, 392-93 (S.D.
Cal. 1959).
75. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
76. Id. at 519-20.
77. Id. at 520-21.
78. Id. at 521 ("[T]he indiscriminate bombing of a civilian populace is not
recognized as a protected political act even when the larger 'political'
objective of the person who sets off the bomb may be to eliminate the
civilian population of a country.") Id.
79. In re Extradition of McMullen, Mag. No. 3-70-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal. May 11,
1979), reprinted in 132 CONG. REc. S16,585-86 (1986); In re Requested Extradition of
Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
80. In re Requested Extradition of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 273 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776,793 (9th Cir. 1986).
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exception." In the United States, courts examining extradition
requests generally do not consider the motivation of the State
requesting extradition or the treatment that the extraditee is likely to
receive in that State. Instead, under the rule of non-inquiry, a court's
review is limited to whether sufficient evidence of criminality exists
and whether the terms of the extradition treaty have been met.' A
form of the rule of non-inquiry first appeared in Ezeta, where the
court refused to examine the political motivation of the Mexican
government in requesting extradition.83  The Supreme Court
developed the rule further in Neely v. Henke, where the Court
concluded that a fugitive could not fight his extradition to Cuba by
claiming he would not receive the same due process protections there
as he would in the United States.' The Court concluded that the
defendant was entitled only to "a trial according to the modes
established in the country where the crime was committed, provided
such trial be had without discrimination against the accused because
of his American citizenship."'  The rule of non-inquiry is also
reflected in the judiciary's refusal to look into the treatment that a
fugitive could receive upon return to the requesting State.'
Provisions of the Supplementary Treaty significantly altered this
traditional rule as will be shown.
B. The 1972 Extradition Treaty
The Jay Treaty of 1794 was the first extradition treaty between
the United States and the U.K.' The Jay Treaty contained a list of
extraditable offenses, which was later expanded in the Webster-
81. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 31, at 188-89.
82. David B. Sullivan, Abandoning the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International
Extradition, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 111-12 (1991).
83. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 31, at 188-89.
84. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th
Cir. 1983) (affirming trial court's decision not to consider defendant's claim of
potential maltreatment in Iceland); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980)
(refusing to consider defendant's claim that he would be at risk of murder or injury
from his political enemies if returned to Italy); In re Normano, 7 F. Supp. 329 (D.
Mass. 1934) (refusing to consider potential abuse that Jewish defendant might receive
if returned to Nazi Germany).
87. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-U.K., 8
Stat. 116.
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Ashburton Treaty of 1 872 .' Subsequent additions to the list of
extraditable offenses were made through supplementary treaties
signed in 1889, 1900 and 1905.' The 1889 supplementary treaty
prevented extradition for political offenses, and this exception was
preserved in the 1972 Treaty." The 1972 Treaty established general
guidelines for cooperation in the extradition of fugitive criminals
apprehended in either country.91 Article III of the 1972 Treaty
describes offenses for which extradition may be sought, and requires
that the offense be an extraditable criminal act under U.K. law and a
felony under American law.' Article V provides for an exemption
for political offenses:
(1) Extradition shall not be granted if:
(c) (i) the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded
by the requested Party as one of a political character; or
(ii) the person sought proves that the request for his
extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish
him for an offense of a political character. 9'
The Article V exemption for political offenses was similar to that
found in other United States extradition treaties.' The signing of the
treaty, however, coincided with a time of great political turmoil in
Northern Ireland. Britain had sent its army into Northern Ireland in
1969 to address increasing tensions and escalating violence by
Nationalist and Unionist paramilitary groups.9 By 1972, chaos and
violence were spiraling out of control.96 Shortly after Bloody Sunday
in January 1972, 7 Britain resumed direct rule over Northern Ireland.'
88. Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9,1842, U.S.-U.K., 8 Stat. 572.
89. Groarke, supra note 41, at 1517.
90. Id. at 1517 n.18; see 1972 Treaty, supra note 3, art. V.
91. See 1972 Treaty, supra note 3.
92. Id. art. III.
93. Id. art. V.
94. See 132 CONG. REc. S16,588 (1986) (statement of Sen. Pen); see, e.g.,
Convention on Extradition Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the State of Israel, Dec. 10, 1962, U.S.-Isr., art.
VI(4), 14 U.S.T. 1707.
95. TowNSHEND, supra note 9, at 207,202.
96. Id. at 206-07.
97. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
98. FRY, supra note 8, at 337.
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In light of this troubled backdrop, it is not surprising that the U.K.
would be dissatisfied with application of the Article V political
offense exception to deny extradition of IRA fugitives, whom it
perceived to be terrorists.
C. Application of the 1972 Treaty
American courts applied Article V of the 1972 Treaty in four
cases dealing with the requested extradition of IRA fugitives. In
three of the cases, courts denied extradition because the acts qualified
as political offenses under the political incidence test;" in the fourth
case, the court determined that the requirements of the political
incidence test were not met and granted the extradition request.'00
1. In re Extradition of McMullen
In 1978, Britain sought the extradition of Peter McMullen, a
former British army soldier and member of the IRA, for the bombing
of a British army barracks in 1974."0 In 1979, a U.S. magistrate ruled
that McMullen could not be extradited to Britain because his actions
were within the scope of the political offense exception of the 1972
Treaty."l After applying the two prongs of the political incidence
test, the magistrate concluded that McMullen was a member of a
group engaged in violence for political ends, and his crimes were
"incidental to and formed as a part of a political disturbance, uprising
or insurrection and in furtherance thereof."'" The court then
concluded that McMullen's crimes were political offenses and refused
to grant extradition.'°
2. In re Requested Extradition of Mackin
The British government sought the extradition of Desmond
Mackin for the attempted murder of a British soldier in Belfast in
99. In re Extradition of McMullen, Mag. No. 3-70-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal. May 11,
1979), reprinted in 132 CONG. REc. S16,585-86 (1986); In re Requested Extradition of
Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Requested Extradition of Doherty, 599 F.
Supp. 270,277 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
100. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776,817-18 (9th Cir. 1986).
101. McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591,593 (9th Cir. 1986).
102. McMullen, reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. S16,585-86.
103. Id.
104. Id. The Ninth Circuit later determined McMullen was ineligible for asylum
or withholding of deportation, and he ultimately was deported. See McMullen, 788
F.2d at 592.
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1978."5 As in McMullen, a magistrate denied the request after
applying the political incidence test." The magistrate found that
Mackin's crimes were political within the meaning of Article V of the
1972 Treaty because he was a member of the IRA, the IRA was
conducting an uprising in Belfast, and "the offenses committed
against the British soldier were incidental to Mackin's role in the
IRA's political uprising in Belfast.""°7 On appeal, the Second Circuit
refused to issue a writ of mandamus to reverse the magistrate, holding
that the magistrate's decision was not appealable. 3
3. In re Requested Extradition of Doherty
In 1983, the British government requested the extradition of
Joseph Doherty, an IRA member who had escaped from prison and
was convicted in absentia of murdering a British army captain."° The
district court concluded that there was a political conflict in Northern
Ireland and that Doherty's offense was committed in furtherance of
the conflict. In a departure from traditional political incidence
analysis, the court determined that those two elements were
insufficient to determine whether a defendant could rely upon the
political offense exception to prevent extradition.1
The court sought to narrow the applicability of the political
incidence test by imposing an additional inquiry into "the nature of
the act, the context in which it is committed, the status of the party
committing the act, the nature of the organization on whose behalf it
is committed, and the particularized circumstances of the place where
the act takes place.... Even under this more demanding formulation
of the political incidence test, the court denied the extradition
request, concluding that Doherty's acts were political in character
because he had ambushed the army patrol and escaped from prison in
furtherance of IRA political objectives."'
105. Mackin, 668 F.2d at 124.
106. Id. at 125.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 130,137.
109. In re Requested Extradition of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 272 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
110. Id. at 274.
111. Id. at 275.
112. Id. at 277. Doherty, however, was eventually deported after the Supreme
Court removed the final legal hurdle in 1992. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314
(1992).
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4. Quinn v. Robinson
In 1981, Britain sought extradition of William Quinn, an
American citizen, to try him for the 1975 murder of a police officer
and for conspiring to cause explosions in Britain in 1974 and 1975."'
A magistrate had found that Quinn was extraditable but the district
court reversed, citing the political offense exception. 4 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reinstated the magistrate's decision after concluding
Quinn's offenses did not meet the requirements of the political
incidence test."' The Ninth Circuit agreed that Quinn's acts could be
construed as being in furtherance of or incidental to a political
disturbance, but decided that the political uprising requirement of the
political incidence test was not satisfied.116
The Ninth Circuit determined that the politically motivated
violence in England did not amount to an uprising despite increased
IRA activity there. 7  The court reasoned that Northern Irish
nationals had "exported their struggle for political change across the
seas to a separate geographical entity" when they initiated a bombing
campaign in England."" The court concluded that IRA activity in
England could not be construed as the actions of nationals who were
seeking to change their own political structures because the IRA
members responsible for the violence were not residents of the
territory where the violence occurred."9 Interestingly, the court did
not find it significant that Northern Ireland and Great Britain are, by
constitution, the same country and ruled by the same government."2
The court also did not reach the issue of whether Quinn's American
citizenship would have barred him from claiming the political offense
exception because he was a citizen of a nation that was not involved
in the political uprising.12 Further, this decision did not rule out the
possibility that Quinn's acts would have been considered political
113. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776,783 (9th Cir. 1986).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 814. The Ninth Circuit determined that the political incidence test did
not require inquiry into the motivations of the offender or the efficacy of his actions
in achieving political objectives, an apparent rejection of the Seventh Circuit's more
stringent inquiry in Doherty. Id. at 811.
116, Id. at 811, 813-14.
117. Id. at 813.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 813, 814.
120. Id. at 813.
121. Id. at 814.
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offenses if committed within the territory of Northern Ireland.
D. Supplementary Treaty of 1985
The McMullen, Mackin and Doherty decisions"2 angered the
British government and eventually led the United States to limit
application of the political offense exception through the
Supplementary Treaty.w The Reagan administration feared that
continued use of the political offense exception would encourage
terrorists to seek haven in the United States.24 Further, the U.S.
government was concerned about relations with Britain, its long-
standing ally, as well as foreign relations in general.'" The
Supplementary Treaty, signed on June 25, 1985, is a significant
departure from traditional extradition practice in several respects.126
Article 1 of the Supplementary Treaty greatly limits the scope of
the political offense exception by providing a list of offenses that are
deemed not political:
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following
shall be regarded as an offense of a political character:
(a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have the
obligation pursuant to a multilateral international agreement
to extradite the person sought or to submit his case to their
competent authorities for decision as to prosecution;
(b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous
bodily harm;
122. In 1985, Quinn's extradition was by no means certain either because he had
petitioned for review of the Ninth Circuit's decision; the Supreme Court, however,
eventually denied certiorari. Quinn v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
123. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1995). The
McMullen, Mackin and Doherty decisions and the Quinn petition for review were
entered into the record at the request of Senator Lugar, demonstrating that these
cases were the impetus for revising the 1972 Treaty. See 132 CONG. REc. S16,558
(statement of Sen. Lugar).
124. Smyth, 61 F.3d at 714.
125. During debate on the Supplementary Treaty, the U.K.'s support for the
United States during bombing raids against Libya was mentioned on several
occasions. See 132 CONG. REc. S16,586, 16,595 (statements of Sen. Lugar, Sen.
D'Amato); see also McMullen v. United States, 953 F.2d 761,768 (2d Cir. 1992).
126. In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1324 (1st Cir. 1993) (indicating
that the Supplementary Treaty departs from accepted extradition protocol); Smyth,
61 F.3d at 714 (distinguishing extradition proceedings under Supplementary Treaty
from traditional extradition practice).
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(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention,
including taking a hostage;
(d) an offense involving use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm,
letter or parcel bomb or any incendiary device if this use
endangers any person; and
(e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or
participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or
attempts to commit such an offense. 27
The broad restrictions greatly narrowed the list of offenses that
qualified for the political offense exception to extradition."
Article 3(b) of the Supplementary Treaty allows either the
accused or the government to appeal a magistrate's extradition
decision to the district court and the court of appeals, if necessary. 9
Ordinarily, when extradition is denied, the government does not have
the right to appeal the magistrate's decision." Article 3(b) thus
"unlocks the gate which has historically barred extradition matters
from proceeding further through the federal courts in the same
manner as other cases."'
131
Further, Article 3(a) significantly departs from the rule of non-
inquiry by giving courts the opportunity to refuse extradition to the
U.K. if the request is a pretext or if the individual would be subjected
to political or religious persecution upon return:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplementary Treaty,
extradition shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the
satisfaction of the competent judicial authority by a preponderance
of the evidence that the request for extradition has in fact been
made with a view to try or punish him on account of his race,
religion, nationality, or political opinions, or that he would, if
surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or
restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion,
127. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 7, art. 1.
128. 132 CONG. REc. S16,587 (1986) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
129. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 7, art. 3.
130. 132 CONG. REc. S16,599 (1986) (statement of Sen. Hatch). See also United
States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1986) (reiterating the "longstanding
principle that the Government's only remedy following denial of an extradition
request is to refile the request with another extradition magistrate" and denying the
government's attempt to appeal the extradition finding directly).
131. Howard, 996 F.2d at 1326.
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nationality, or political opinions. 13 2
Arguably, the language of Article 3(a) and its legislative history
suggest that Congress intended for courts to inquire into the fairness
of the criminal justice system in the U.K.'33 The Senate had added
Article 3 to the Supplementary Treaty as a compromise because
many senators were uncomfortable with the virtual elimination of the
political offense exception."' During congressional debate on the
Supplementary Treaty, Senator Eagleton argued that the scope of
inquiry under Article 3(a) should be narrow, limited only to analysis
of specific factors that might deny the extraditee a fair trial and not
questions of abstract fairness of the judicial system as a whole.'35
Senators Kerry, Biden and Pell, however, claimed that Article 3(a)
mandated a broad scope of inquiry into the entire judicial system of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland.136 Senators expressed concern
about the British criminal justice system and its treatment of
suspected members of paramilitary groups, in particular the use of
juryless "Diplock courts" when trying such offenders, as justifying
greater inquiry into the fairness of the judicial system as a whole."
E. Application of the Supplementary Treaty
American courts have examined the provisions of the
Supplementary Treaty in three cases involving IRA fugitives.13 One
132. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 7, art. 3.
133. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REc. S16,588 (1986) (statement of Sen. Pell) ("[Article
3(c)] establishes an affirmative right of inquiry into the justice system in Northern
Ireland."); S. Exec. Rep. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 4-5 (1986) (statement of Sen.
Biden) ("[T]he defendant will have an opportunity in Federal court to introduce
evidence that he or she would personally, because of their race, religion, nationality
or political opinion, not be able to get a fair trial because of the court system or any
other aspect of the judicial system in a requesting country .... "); see Howard, 996
F.2d at 1329-30; Kent Wellington, Extradition: A Fair and Effective Weapon in the
War on Terrorism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1447, 1450 (1990) (discussing role of non-inquiry
in extradition policy).
134. See In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711,714-15 (9th Cir. 1995).
135. 132 CONG. REc. S16,798-803 (1986) (statement of Sen. Eagleton).
136. Id. at S16,588, S16,798-803 (statements of Sen. Pell, Sen. Kerry, and Sen.
Biden).
137. Id.
138. In re Extradition of Howard, the first case to examine the applicability of
Article 3(a), did not involve the extradition of a member of the IRA. See Howard,
996 F.2d at 1320 (concluding that black defendant did not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that he would be unable to receive a fair trial because
of racial prejudice in U.K.).
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court concluded that the Supplementary Treaty was an unlawful bill
of attainder with respect to the defendant."'9 In a later case, the court
determined that Article 3(a) did not bar extradition of the
defendant.1" A third case ultimately was dismissed as the British
government abandoned its efforts to extradite the defendants in light
of the early release provisions of the Belfast Agreement.'
1. McMullen v. United States
In McMullen v. United States, the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's conclusion that the Supplementary Treaty was an
unlawful bill of attainder with respect to Peter McMullen.' 2 A
magistrate previously had determined McMullen was not extraditable
under the political offense exception to the 1972 Treaty.143 During the
U.S. government's subsequent efforts to deport him, however, the
Supplementary Treaty came into effect.1" Because the
Supplementary Treaty virtually eliminated the political offense
exception that McMullen had previously relied upon to fight
extradition, the U.K. filed a second request for his extradition.145 The
district court granted McMullen's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
after determining the Supplementary Treaty was a bill of attainder as
applied to McMullen. 46  The court concluded that the retroactive
provision of the Supplementary Treaty was enacted to reverse the
judicial holding that McMullen was not extraditable.147 The Second
Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusions, holding that the
treaty provisions specifically targeted McMullen and were intended to
punish him without the benefit of judicial process"
139. McMullen v. United States, 953 F.2d 761,769 (2d Cir. 1992).
140. Smyth, 61 F.3d at 721-22.
141. In re Requested Extradition of Artt, Brennan & Kirby, 972 F. Supp. 1253
(N.D. Cal. 1997), rev'd 158 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 1998), reh'g granted, 183 F.3d 944 (9th
Cir. 1999) (dismissed following British government withdrawal of extradition
request); see Bob Egelko, Britain Drops Extradition Bid; Peace Accord Helps 3 Bay
Area Men Win Legal Fight, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 30, 2000, at A3; see also supra notes
23-25 and accompanying text.
142. McMullen, 953 F.2d at 769.
143. In re Extradition of McMullen, Mag. No. 3-70-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal. May 11,
1979), reprinted in 132 CONG. REc. S16,585-86 (1986); see also supra notes 100-04 and
accompanying text.
144. McMullen, 953 F.2d at 763.
145. Id. at 763-64.
146. Id. at 764.
147. Id. at 766.
148. Id. at 769. The court found it persuasive that McMullen's case was discussed
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2. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth
In re Requested Extradition of Smyth was the first case in which a
fugitive member of the IRA challenged extradition by relying on
Article 3(a). 149 The British government sought to extradite James
Smyth to serve the remainder of his sentence in the Maze Prison,
from which he had escaped in 1983.15 The district court denied the
extradition request, concluding that Smyth had established a defense
to extradition under Article 3(a) by showing he would be persecuted
because of his religious and political views if he were returned."' The
Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the district court incorrectly
considered evidence of general discrimination in Northern Ireland
against nationalists.'52 The Ninth Circuit also determined that the
district court erroneously inquired into general political conditions
instead of conducting an individualized inquiry under Article 3(a)."3
The appellate court concluded that Smyth did not show he would be
subjected to mistreatment beyond the remaining term of his sentence
or that he would be persecuted because of his political or religious
beliefs."4 Smyth was extradited on August 18, 1996.
3. In re Requested Extradition of Artt, Brennan, & Kirby
In re Requested Extradition of Artt, Brennan, & Kirby is the most
recent case to examine the applicability of Article 3(a) to IRA
fugitives.55 In this decision, the district court relied on the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning in Smyth to define the scope of inquiry:
Article 3(a) does not prevent extradition because of general
political or violent conditions in Northern Ireland; rather, the
inquiries must be individualized to these respondents. And any
alleged adverse consequences to them upon their return to
during congressional debate on the Supplementary Treaty and that the decision
holding McMullen non-extraditable was reprinted in the Congressional Record. Id.
at 765-66.
149. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 61 F.3d 711,716 (9th Cir. 1995).
150. Id. at 712.
151. In re Requested Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1152 (N.D. Cal.
1994).
152 Smyth, 61 F.3d at 720.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. In re Requested Extradition of Artt, Brennan & Kirby, 972 F. Supp. 1253,
(N.D. Cal. 1997), rev'd 158 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 1998), reh'g granted, 183 F.3d 944 (9th
Cir. 1999) (dismissed following British government withdrawal of extradition
request).
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Northern Ireland must be acts of the criminal justice system and
not of society generally.
The inquiry under the treaty must... distinguish between
punishment for religious and political reasons, which would bar
extradition, and punishment for a criminal act, which would not bar
extradition.11
6
The court examined the facts of each defendant's conviction to
determine whether any of the three defendants could rely on Article
3(a) as a defense to extradition. Kevin Artt was convicted in 1983 of
the murder of a prison official.'57 The key evidence against him was
his own uncorroborated confession, which he maintained was
involuntarily given after enduring several days of interrogation and
police mistreatment."' Pol Brennan did not dispute his conviction,
but asserted he should not be extradited for humanitarian reasons
because British soldiers had beaten him.9 He further claimed that
his statements to interrogators were coerced and should not have
been used to support his conviction." Terence Kirby was convicted
of felony murder, use of explosives, and possession of a firearm and
explosives with intent to injure. 6' He did not dispute that he had
participated in one bombing offense, but maintained he should not
have been convicted of the second bombing and murder because the
conviction was based on his confession, which was obtained after
three days of interrogation and torture.62  All three were
apprehended in California several years after escaping from the Maze
prison in 1983, and each had invoked Article 3(a) as a defense to
extradition."
The district court concluded that Article 3(a) did not bar
extradition of any of the three defendants, holding that they had been
convicted because they committed serious crimes, not on account of
their race, religion, nationality or political opinions."6 The court
156. Id. at 1259-60 (citing Smyth, 61 F.3d at 715).
157. Id. at 1265.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1268.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1264.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1256.
164. Id. at 1274-75.
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further concluded that none of the defendants would be punished,
detained or restricted in their personal liberty because of their beliefs;
any further punishment or ill treatment would be the result of the
crimes they had committed.65
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court but withdrew its
decision'" after granting the government's petition for rehearing.67
When the Ninth Circuit granted the rehearing, it instructed the
parties to prepare to address specific issues including the
requirements and applicability of Article 3(a) and the appropriate
scope of inquiry."l ' In September 2000, however, the British
government informed the court that it did not intend to pursue the
extradition of the three defendants and the case was dismissed.69 The
British government concluded that pursing extradition would be a
pointless act of bad faith because the three defendants would have
been freed already under early release provisions of the Belfast
Agreement.'
I. Criticisms of the Supplementary Treaty and Proposals for
Reform
As commentators have stated, "It is easier to criticize the case
law than it is to propose legislative reforms. It is even more difficult
to devise a reform that will remedy the known defects without
substituting new ones."'' This statement is true not only for
provisions of extradition treaties-such as the Supplementary
Treaty-but also for congressional attempts to revise provisions of
Title 18 pertaining to extradition law. Indeed, many of the
criticisms of the various reform-oriented Extradition Acts are
applicable to the Supplementary Treaty as well because these
legislative efforts incorporated similar mechanisms to prevent abuse
of the political offense exception by terrorists." This section
165. Id.
166. In re Requested Extradition of Artt, Brennan, & Kirby, 158 F.3d 462 (9th Cir.
1998).
167. In re Requested Extradition of Artt, Brennan, & Kirby, 183 F.3d 944 (9th Cir.
1999).
168. Id. at 945.
169. Egelko, supra note 141, at A3.
170. Id.
171. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 31, at 192.
172 See id.
173. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States:
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attempts to identify not only criticisms and concerns arising from the
Supplementary Treaty but also proposals for reform of extradition
practice that are relevant to the Supplementary Treaty.
A. Criticisms and Concerns
The Supplementary Treaty arguably is over-inclusive and
interferes with judicial flexibility in making determinations on
extradition. Article 1 of the Supplementary Treaty exempts
practically all acts of violence from the political offense exception,
greatly limiting case-by-case examination by a court into the accused's
political motives.174 Further, by preventing use of the political offense
exception for broad categories of acts, Article 1 ignores the possibility
that under some circumstances, the person committing such an act
might deserve protection. Article 1 fails to distinguish between
offenses against civilians and offenses against the government or
agents of the State such as the police or military, treating terrorists
who bomb civilians the same way as insurgents who target the State.175
One commentator has suggested that preventing all acts of violence
from being political offenses requires "that political uprisings be
fought without using weapons, without causing death or serious injury
and without taking prisoners," and that any uprising more violent
than a pillow fight would be considered an act of terrorism.'76
A second concern is that the Supplementary Treaty usurps the
judiciary's traditional role in evaluating extradition requests and
politicizes the extradition process. Commentators have suggested
that by signing the Supplementary Treaty, the United States has
become involved in the U.K.'s internal battles against paramilitaries
1981-1983, 17 AKRON L. REv. 495, 547-48 (1984) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Extradition
Reform]. For example, both the Senate and House versions of the Extradition Act of
1983 define the political offense exception by identifying acts that may not be
considered political offenses. Similarly, Article 1 of the Supplementary Treaty
identifies acts that are deemed not to be political offenses. Thus, the Extradition Act
of 1983 and the Supplementary Treaty attempt to define the political offense
exception by saying what it is not, i.e. by specifying acts that are deemed not to be
political offenses, rather than by defining what the political offense exception actually
means. See id.
174. See id. at 549 (discussing lack of flexibility in determining accused's political
motives as being a difficulty in applying the Extradition Act of 1983).
175. Groarke, supra note 41, at 1528.
176. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 31, at 194 (criticizing over-inclusiveness of senate
bill that would have prevented crimes of violence and offenses involving firearms
from being considered political offenses except under extraordinary circumstances).
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in Northern Ireland because the Treaty bars crimes commonly
committed by paramilitary groups from being political offenses.'n In
effect, the Supplementary Treaty could be construed as
demonstrating tacit U.S. support for the longstanding British
government position that the conflict in Northern Ireland is a security
problem, not a political struggle. More generally, allowing the
executive to limit the political offense exception on a treaty-by-treaty
basis raises conflict of interest concerns: "the decision-maker should
not balance the international foreign policy implications of its
decisions against an individual's right to fundamental fairness.""17
Arguably, it is more appropriate for the judiciary to consider
applicability of the political offense exception because it can make its
determinations out of concern for the rights of the accused instead of
on the basis of political expediency.179
Further, addressing terrorism through bilateral treaties like the
Supplementary Treaty can lead to a double standard in United States
extradition practice. By amending treaties to eliminate use of the
political offense exception, the United States is "[placing] its
imprimatur on the political and legal status quo in those countries ...
[and] implying that it does not have confidence in the political and
legal status quo in nations with which it does not conclude similar
treaties."' Thus, selective elimination of the political offense
exception could be perceived as a reflection of the U.S. government's
views on the fairness of a country's political and legal systems.
Additionally, the "treaty-by-treaty" approach is unwise because it is
likely to lead to use of the political offense exception as a bargaining
tool in foreign relations. For example, a State with an interest in
extraditing political fugitives could insist on removing the political
offense exception from its extradition treaty with the United States in
return for supporting a U.S. interest. 1 Nations with poor human
rights records thus could pressure the United States to eliminate the
political offense exception from their extradition treaties, removing
the protection where political dissenters need it the most.
177. 132 CONG. REc. S16,593 (statement of Sen. D'Amato) (suggesting the
Supplementary Treaty was an attempt to resolve British political problems);
Groarke, supra note 41, at 1527.
178. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 31, at 209.
179. Groarke, supra note 41, at 1529.
180. Id. at 1541.
181. Id.
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B. Proposals for Reform
The extradition process must balance many different objectives:
(1) the human rights of fugitives must be protected; (2) American
courts and the executive branch must avoid complicity in political
persecution; (3) human rights must be protected in a manner that
assures a maximum degree of neutrality in other States' political
disputes; and (4) terrorists must be brought to justice." The over-
inclusiveness of Article 1 could be remedied by distinguishing
between violence committed against civilians and violence against the
government or agents of the State."1 The political offense exception
then could be barred in cases involving the former. Such a distinction
is appealing because violence against civilians is intuitively more
offensive and less justifiable as a means of affecting political change
than acts that target the State.'4 A potential problem with such an
approach is in defining "innocent civilians," especially in Northern
Ireland where opposing paramilitary groups are comprised of and
supported by civilians. Moreover, as in Northern Ireland, allegations
of collusion between government forces and paramilitaries further
complicate the question of how to categorize the different actors.
On a more general level, the use of multilateral treaties to
establish extradition standards could eliminate the inconsistency and
confusion caused by a treaty-by-treaty approach to the political
offense exception. 6 The European Convention on the Suppression
of Terrorism," the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), ' and the United Nations Convention
182. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 31, at 192.
183. Groarke, supra note 41, at 1542-43.
184. Id. at 1543.
185. Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officers have been convicted of
involvement with the Ulster Volunteer Force. Stephen Livingstone, Policing,
Criminal Justice and the Rule of Law, in LESSONS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND 87, 89
n.12 (Jon Hayes & Paul O'Higgins eds., 1990). Further, in May 2001, the European
Court of Human Rights concluded that the U.K. violated the right to life in a case
brought by the family of a person killed by Loyalist paramilitaries, allegedly through
collusion with the RUC. Shanaghan v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 37715/97,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
186. Phillips, supra note 40, at 353-54; 132 CONG. REC. S16,593 (statement of Sen.
D'Amato) (proscribing terrorist acts through broader multilateral treaties is a better
approach to combating terrorism than the abolition of the political offense exception
in the Supplementary Treaty).
187. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, adopted Nov. 10,
1976, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976).
188. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking),
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Against Illicit Drug Traffic, Narcotics, Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances" 9 are examples of multilateral treaties addressing specific
criminal acts. Under international law, and under the terms of many
United States extradition treaties, crimes that are the subject of
multilateral conventions are extraditable offenses."' However, the
use of such treaties does not necessarily eliminate the need for a case-
by-case examination of the political offense exception because an
individual could commit an international crime under circumstances
suggesting that it is a political offense."9 ' Moreover, negotiating and
ratifying multilateral treaties is a long, politicized process. Because
States bargain and compromise on treaty provisions according to
their interests, there is no guarantee that the rights of political
offenders would prevail in a multilateral treaty any more than in a
bilateral extradition treaty. Finally, it is extremely unlikely that a
multilateral treaty defining the political offense exception could ever
be drafted, given the differing State approaches to the political
offense exception and disagreements over definitions of terrorism.
Finally, commentators have suggested that relying on neutral,
third party courts to adjudicate political offense exception claims
would best ensure that fugitives receive fair and impartial hearings."
An international court or commission could be created for the
purpose of hearing extradition requests where the accused has
claimed the political offense exception as a defense to extradition."
The structures and procedures of the European Court of Human
Rights could serve as a model for such a court." Alternatively, the
International Criminal Court could play a role in extradition requests
where the political nature of the accused's acts is at issue. 95
adopted Dec. 16,1970,22 U.S.T. 1641,860 U.N.T.S. 105.
189. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Drug Traffic, Narcotics, Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, adopted Dec. 19, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.82/15 (1988),
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989).
190. See, e.g., 1972 Treaty, supra note 3, apps.
191. One commentator has posed a hypothetical whereby an individual who is
persecuted for political, racial or religious reasons commandeers an aircraft, without
causing harm to others, in order to escape from serious bodily harm. Bassiouni,
Extradition Reform, supra note 173, at .550-551.
192. Groarke, supra note 41, at 1543; Phillips, supra note 40, at 355-57.
193. Phillips, supra note 40, at 356-57.
194. Groarke, supra note 41, at 1544.
195. Cf. M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Comprehensive Strategic Approach on
International Cooperation for the Prevention, Control and Suppression of
International and Transnational Criminality, 15 NOVA L. REv. 353, 365-71 (1991)
(suggesting that integration of modalities of international cooperation, including
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There are advantages to utilizing an impartial tribunal to
examine political offense exception claims. For example, such a court
could apply a single, uniform body of law and consistent standards,
eliminating the various approaches practiced in different States.
Removing decisions to a neutral forum would reduce the impact of
political considerations on the extradition process, both in the
requesting State and the State of refuge.1 6  States could avoid
potential foreign relations ramifications of difficult extradition
decisions if such decisions were removed to an impartial forum."9
However, there are also many drawbacks to such a proposal,
including State reluctance to cede sovereignty and power to
supranational bodies such as the International Criminal Court.198 The
appropriate scope of inquiry for such a body would also be hard to
define. For example, would it conduct generalized inquiries into the
fairness of a State's legal and political systems, or would it examine
only the treatment of the particular defendant? Finally, as noted
above, States have adopted different approaches to the political
offense exception and disagree over definitions of terrorism. Such
disputes would complicate efforts to utilize a neutral tribunal to
adjudicate political offense exception claims.
IV Conclusion
The political offense exception has long been a part of
extradition law, but its use during the 1970s and 1980s to deny
extradition of IRA fugitives troubled the British and American
governments. The subsequent Supplementary Treaty, which greatly
narrowed the exception for members of paramilitary groups such as
the IRA, has raised many questions about the appropriate approach
to extradition of fugitives with political objectives who have used
violence in furtherance of their goals. As one district court noted:
[T]errorists should not be sheltered from the criminal consequences
of their acts just because their acts were committed in the name of a
political or religious cause. Because a terrorist commits a crime of
violence in support of a cause does not mean that the terrorist,
when caught and convicted, is being punished because of that
cause. Terrorists must accept the consequences of their criminal
extradition, could be facilitated through international criminal court structures).
196. Id. at 357.
197. Groarke, supra note 41, at 1543.
198. Phillips, supra note 40, at 356-57.
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acts, regardless of the name in which they were performed.1 9
However, individuals also have a right to turn to political activism to
foster change and counter repression, and dissidents should be
protected from government retaliation for political activities or
speech.'f Clearly, the crux of the matter is how to balance the rights
of political activists with States' interests in bringing terrorists to
justice.
The Northern Ireland peace process has created a landscape
where the Supplementary Treaty is no longer necessary or desirable
as a means of effecting extradition. The Belfast Agreement signed in
1998 demonstrated British government willingness to bring extremist
organizations into the political process. It also showed that
paramilitaries were willing to participate in political methods of
change. Arguably, such developments signal acceptance on the part
of the British government of the political nature of the conflict in
Northern Ireland, and acknowledgment by the paramilitaries that
political solutions can succeed.2 1 Elimination of the Supplementary
Treaty would carry great symbolic weight as a gesture of good will to
members of paramilitary groups and the communities who support
them. At the same time, it would eliminate many of the problems
identified above that can flow from using a treaty-by-treaty approach
to extradition, such as eliminating the appearance of U.S.
involvement in the U.K.'s policies in Northern Ireland. Finally, in
light of the early release provisions of the Belfast Agreement, the
Supplementary Treaty should be abolished because its real targets,
IRA fugitives, have already been released from British and Irish
prisons.
Further, general concerns about potential abuse of the political
offense exception in U.S. courts are more appropriately addressed
through modification of the judiciary's approach to the political
offense exception rather than through treaties that target specific
groups or offenses. Indeed, the question of how to balance the rights
of political activists with States' interests in bringing terrorists to
199. In re Requested Extradition of Artt, Brennan & Kirby, 972 F. Supp. 1253,
1258 (N.D. Cal. 1997), rev'd 158 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 1998), reh'g granted, 183 F.3d 944
(9th Cir. 1999) (dismissed following British government withdrawal of extradition
request).
200. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776,783 (9th Cir. 1986); Groarke, supra note 41,
at 1519.
201. McEvoy, supra note 21, at 1573-74.
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justice is a global concern and by no means unique to the U.K.
Movement away from rigid application of the two prongs of the
political incidence test and towards a more flexible evaluation of
political offense claims would serve all States' interests in preventing
abuse of the exception. In some respects, this has already started to
occur as shown in the Quinn v. Robinson and Eain v. Wilkes
decisions, where the courts diverged from the rigid two-prong
political incidence analysis.2" Closer examination of the
circumstances surrounding the offense will better reveal whether the
offender has a legitimate claim to the political offense exception than
strict application of the "political uprising" and "in furtherance of
political unrest" prongs of the political incidence test.
Rigid application of the political incidence test prompted the
United States and the U.K. to revise the 1972 Treaty. Whatever the
merits of the Supplementary Treaty at the time of its enactment, it is
now time to eliminate it and focus instead on developing a more
flexible approach to the political offense exception.
202. See supra notes 75-78,113-21 and accompanying text.
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